Please note that RFG World Private Limited and Gold Market US Corp and its subsidiaries send e-mails only from our corporate servers and never use public e-mail domains, and we do not authorize any third parties to do so for us. If you have questions about the validity of a communication you have received, you may contact Gold Market US Corp at info@goldmarketusa.com to confirm.
For more information on these fraudulent schemes, you may want to refer to the following resources that describe and warn about Storage Spoofing. Please note that these websites are not affiliated with Gold Market US Corp in any way and Gold Market US Corp makes no representation as to the veracity of the information provided.
https://globaloilandgastrading.com/black-lists-1
https://ferm-rotterdam.nl/nl/nieuws/caution-storage-spoofing-part-1-port-rotterdam-english-version
https://ferm-rotterdam.nl/nl/nieuws/caution-storage-spoofing-part-2-too-good-be-true.
DISCLAIMER: RFG World Private Limited Gold Market US Corp HAS NEITHER VERIFIED CLAIMS MADE ON WEBSITES CONNECTED BY LINKS PROVIDED ON THIS PAGE NOR DOES IT CLAIM THAT ANY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SUCH LINKED SITES ARE TRUE. USERS MAY USE SUCH INFORMATION AT THEIR OWN RISK ALONE AND Gold Market US Corp IS IN NO WAY LIABLE FOR ANY MISINFORMATION APPEARING ON LINKED SITES.
LINKS TO VARIOUS BLACK LISTS AND SCAM ALERT SITES
FERM : https://ferm-rotterdam.nl/nl/blacklist
IP TRACKER : https://www.ip-tracker.org/blacklist-check.php?ip=5.200.14.150
OIL BUYERS’ BLACK LIST: http://www.ofertas-commodities.com/black-list.htm
BLACKLIST : http://www.inblacklist.pro/
PETROFINDER: http://www.petrofinder.com/carbon/carbon_list.php
NASAA : http://www.nasaa.org/6782/oil-gas-investment-fraud/
FRAUD GUIDES: https://www.fraudguides.com/investments/oil-and-gas-scams/
OILSCAMS: https://www.fraudguides.com/investments/oil-and-gas-scams/
SCAM SURVIVORS: https://www.scamsurvivors.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=44&t=15346
STOP 419: http://419advancefeefraud.blogspot.com/2013/12/russian-oil-scammers.html
RUSSIAN OIL SCAMMERS: http://russianoilscammers.blogspot.com/
BLACK LIST TRITON: http://alexb.at.ua/files/2010_Blacklist_from_Gazprom-6_1.pdf
SCAMWARNERS: https://www.scamwarners.com/?t=55999
STAR CONSTRUCTION: http://starconstruction21.blogspot.com/
SOME MORE SITES BELOW:
http://www.rosneft.com/Investors/beware/
http://eng.transneft.ru/attention/
http://www.gazprom.com/about/subsidiaries/list-items/
(List of Authorized Subsidiaries )
Scams involve the setting up of fake websites for various imaginary oil, energy, mineral, agrochemical, natural gas and coal companies. To support the scam, fake government, associations, banks, law firms, tank terminals, shipping companies, and due diligence websites are also set up. The purpose is to induce the victim into paying advance fees for non-existent oil or other commodities. Fake documents are sent to the potential victim as further inducement. Many scammers will request an advance payment or fee amounting to a large sum of money, before any oil is delivered, since, of course, no oil will ever be delivered. The fee is usually for some fake government or association allocation code, license fee, tax, contract servicing, authorization fee, mandate seller fee, down payment, federation fee, government ministry fee, pipeline fee, transportation company fee, etc. The fake advance fees are only limited by the scammer’s imagination, so keep in mind that ANY request for an advance fee is likely a scam! Frequently, the scammers request the fake fees be paid to some fake government officials or oil association agents through a fake websites. These scammers will state that such payment or fees are “customary.” They are not! ANY ADVANCE FEE IS LIKELY TO BE A SCAM!
The most prevalent of the scams in the commodities and trading sector has been the trend of email hacking and faking. A chain of correspondence between Party A and Party B arranging payment for the sale of goods, for example, is intercepted by hackers who then impersonate the parties using a very slightly altered email address so as not to arouse suspicion. Typically the hackers then advise Party A that the payment account details have been changed and Party A transfers sums to the wrong account.
These altered account details are very often not suspicious in and of themselves. The fraudster’s email account may be as subtle as a single letter change to the email domain name. It is not hard to see how even the most sophisticated business may fall victim to such fraud.
Basic checks can help to prevent such fraud, including checking email addresses carefully particularly if there is a change in tone of correspondence or a change to payment details and checking any requested changes to account details via telephone (ideally with a known individual) with your counterparty. Having a strict policy of rigorous checks on account changes can go a long way to solving the problem. Even with the most extensive training procedures for staff, mistakes can still happen and there is no question that, as monitoring techniques improve, fraudsters will find alternative ways of disrupting business for financial gain.
